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The general financial stress confronting Chinese local 
governments requires public spending to become more efficient. 
While previous work has attempted to study what determines the 
efficiency, the focus was put on various factors that were not 
under direct control by policymakers. This paper revisits the 
issue, controlling the factors commonly found to be significant 
in the literature, by evaluating the role of the spending 
structure which can be easily adjusted by policymakers. The 
paper focuses on the investment ratio, as public investment is 
known to be a key driver of the Chinese economy. Using data of 
31 provinces between 2000 and 2017, we estimated a Tobit model, 
with the efficiency of public spending calculated by data 
envelopment analysis (DEA). The efficiency of public spending is 
partially determined by the structure of the spending; the 
former is an increasing function of the latter up to an optimal 
rate, which is estimated to be between 19-23 percent. As most 
local governments are over-investing according to this standard, 
future improvement of budget management would require 
policymakers to concentrate much more on non-investment 
projects, such as spending on benefits, education and healthcare 
– hence, the provision of public goods and services. 
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In recent years, China has experienced a rapid fiscal expansion as its growth strategy changed from 
“speed-driven” to “quality-driven”. The total national public spending has risen by about twenty times 
between 2000 and 2017, from 1.58 trillion Yuan to 20.3 trillion, implying an average growth of 16.3 
percent per annum (The National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2019). However, the rise in fiscal 
revenue was not fast. Since 2008, a primary deficit has emerged; and the rising figure reflected the 
general, exacerbating financial stress confronting the local governments. On the one hand, the tax 
sharing reform greatly reduced local revenues, while burdens on local budgets remained1; on the other 
hand, tasks of promoting growth and urbanization – which also led to “fiscal competition” among 
local governments – became more onerous, which worsened the government’s budget position. 
Despite the rising deficit, the return on public provision has not been as high. While public spending 
can  be  broadly  categorized into  three  types – investment,  goods  consumption, and  purchase  of 
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services, it is generally aware that none of these areas developed substantially compared to the input. 
The problem points directly to the efficiency of the spending, which is the focus of this research.  
This paper studies how the structure of public spending affects the efficiency of it. It asks two 
specific questions: a) Whether the structure of spending affects its efficiency? b) Whether local 
government budgets are ill-structured? It focuses on the ratio of public investment to the whole public 
spending, for that public investment is known to be the most important fiscal instrument dominated 
the growth of the Chinese economy over the past twenty years. Since neither goods consumption nor 
purchases of service is productive, spending on these two categories can be defined more broadly to 
be “public consumption”, whose ratio is simply one minus the investment ratio. This simplification 
allows us to focus just on the investment ratio. 
Compared to previous works, this study is innovative in the way that it considers the structure of 
public spending, which is a factor that can be readily reviewed and revised by policymakers. While 
many scholars have studied what determined the efficiency of fiscal and/or monetary policy (Chen and 
Zhang, 2008; Chen and Zhang, 2011; Tang and Wang, 2012), Mandl, Dierx and Ilzkovitz (2008) 
pointed that previous works had mainly focused on factors that were practically “uncontrollable”, as 
they were usually outcomes of policies (thus, endogenous, such as GDP growth and fiscal revenue), or 
factors rooted in the deep structure of the economy (which hardly shifted with policies, such as 
population density and openness of the economy). By contrast, the structure of spending is a factor 
policymakers have full and direct control, and is therefore more relevant from the decision-making 
viewpoint. Indeed, given that the debt issue of local governments is looming and that over-investment 
in some places has started to cause problems, it is worth considering how limited fiscal revenue may 
be allocated for it to be spent in the most efficient way.  
This paper adopts a two-step approach. It first calculates the efficiency of public spending using 
data envelopment analysis (DEA). It then estimates a panel Tobit model allowing for selected control 
variables widely found to be significant, to examine the role of the investment ratio. The efficiency of 
public spending is found to be an increasing function of the investment ratio up to an optimal rate. 
Compared to the optimal rate, the data show that most local governments have been over-investing. 
A more efficient allocation of future revenue would require spending to lean more on non-investment 
items, hence, more on the provision of public goods and services. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature; Section 3 describes 
the methodology; Section 4 reports the results; Section 5 concludes the paper; Section 6 discusses 
the policy implications; Section 7 reflects the limitations and directions for future studies. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Existing studies on the efficiency of public spending have mainly been comparative research, focusing 
on how environment and/or institutional settings could have resulted in differences in the efficiency of 
parts, or the whole schedule, of the government budget. Gerdtham et al. (1995) studied the healthcare 
system of the member countries of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). They found that reimbursements to privately-managed systems were more efficient than 
direct spending on publicly-managed systems. Gupta and Verhoeven (2001) considered the education 
and health spending in Africa, Asia, and Western Hemisphere, and found high government wages and 
intra-sectoral allocation of government resources explained why efficiency was low in these areas. 
Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) constructed a pooling of US and OECD countries and found that 
the inefficiency of public spending was partially due to government size. Afonso and Aubyn (2006) 
investigated the education sector; they found that the efficiency of educational spending was affected 
not only by economic development, but also by educational attainment. Borger and Kerstens (1996) 
studied the Belgian data and found that besides educational attainment, higher population density –  
which implied a lower average cost of management –  improved efficiency, whereas higher tax 
revenue undermined efficiency due to wastes. Similarly, Hauner (2008) studied the Russian data and 
found that the larger the scale of government spending, the lower the efficiency of the spending. 
Literature shows that similar type of studies exploring efficiency of the spending has been 
conducted in China. Chen and Zhang (2008) compared the episodes before and after the tax sharing 
reform and found that the reform clearly improved the overall efficiency. Tang and Wang (2012) 
compared different geographical regions; they found that the Mid-China, whose level of economic 
development was below the East but above the West, performed the best on efficiency. Liu and Liu 
(2016) studied the health sector. They found that, although health spending became more and more 
efficient for the sector as a whole, the efficiency of personal spending was declining. Zhang et al. 
(2019) studied the spending on environmental protection; they found that efficiency rose with foreign 
direct investments but fell with fiscal decentralization. 
Unfortunately, although the above studies have covered quite varied aspects of the efficiency of 
public spending, none of them was able to evaluate the structure of the spending itself. As Li (2009) 
has pointed, among all potential factors that could have affected efficiency, the structure of spending 
would be a fundamental one, as it determined the fund’s allocation in the first place. The idea may be 
illustrated using a simple model where the government chooses between public investment and other 
spending in an efficiency maximization problem. Let the government, as illustrated in Figure 1, be an 
efficiency maximiser who  allocates fiscal income in each period between  public investment and other  
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spending. The government faces a map of efficiency frontiers denoted by e1, e2 and e3, where the 
further the frontier is from the origin, the higher the efficiency the government enjoys. For given fiscal 
income AB, both P1 and P2 are sub-optimal spending structures, as the former represents under-
investment, while the latter represents over-investment. The optimal combination of investment and 
other spending is represented by the (Pa, Pb) pair where the efficiency frontier e2 is tangent with AB at 
P*. Thus, at least theoretically, there exists an optimal investment ratio at which the efficiency of public 
spending can be maximized. 
 
 
                                                                                           Source: Authors’ Presentation 
 
Figure 1. Structure of Public Spending and Efficiency 
 
The existence of such optimal ratio is precisely what we aim to test and evaluate in the following 
work. Specifically, we set up the following hypotheses: 
 
H1: The structure of public spending affects the efficiency of the spending in a non-linear 
manner. 
H2: The structure of public spending affects the efficiency of the spending in a non-linear 
manner and the marginal impact is partially affected by economic growth. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Data 
The data we use were annual data of 31 Chinese provinces between 2000 and 2017. Except for the 
efficiency data, the time series  were collected  from  the China Statistics Year Book, China Labor Year  
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Book, and the Statistics Year Books for each province via the CNKI database (China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure, 2019). While descriptive statistics of the data are reported following the 
description of the model, in the next two subsections we explain our measurement of the structure and 
efficiency of public spending.  
 
-The Structure of Public Spending 
The structure of public spending is defined as the ratios of different spending to total spending in a 
fiscal year. Following Aschauer (1989), we categorized the spending into two types — one directly 
related to production which we call “public investment”, the other covering spending on public goods 
and services which we call “public consumption”. The former can be, for example, public investment 
in infrastructure, exploitation of natural resources, and transfers to state-owned enterprises. The latter 
includes expenditure on education, health, social security, and public services. 
Figure 2 plots the public investment ratios for the main regions of China between 2000 and 2017. 
The East, the Middle and the West are similar in pattern, and they all had high investment ratios. At the 
country level the ratio was about 33 percent, which was three times that in the US and six times that in 
the Euro area2. The ratio had a modest tendency of falling  before 2007. This was  mainly  due  to  the  
 
 
                                                                      Source: Authors’ Presentation using NBSC Data 
 
Figure 2. Public Investment in China as a Ratio to Total Spending 
 
overheated Chinese economy at the start of the 2000s, which made the fiscal authority more 
prudential in implementing new investment projects. Behind this prudence it was the tension between 
the declined food supply and the excess  rise in fixed capital in the other sectors at  the time. The ratio  
International Journal of Management, Economics and Social Sciences 
 
211 
 
reached the minimum in 2007, and then reversed, as the global financial crisis forced the Chinese 
government to implement a series of fiscal stimulus packages dominated by public investments. The 
ratio reached the peak in 2011 exceeding 37 percent. It then leveled off at just about the same ratio.  
At the regional level, both the Middle and the West are outliers before 2007: The Middle clearly 
uninvested, while the West clearly overinvested, compared to the East and the national average. The 
former reflects that fiscal expansion at the time was biased towards the East and the West, which left 
the Middle behind. The East, being the most developed region, was always favored by capital. The 
West, being the least developed, nevertheless received particularly more support from the central 
government which aimed for a balanced growth. The several government-led initiatives, such as the 
Western Development Initiative, then made the West the most invested region (in terms of the 
investment ratio). However, all this divergence was substantially reduced since the financial crisis after 
which the fiscal authority had to reallocate the resources. 
We omitted to plot the public consumption ratios to keep the figure concise. By definition, the 
timelines of them would just mirror the investment ratios. 
 
-The Efficiency of Public Spending 
The efficiency of public spending is defined as the ratio of actual outputs to the “potential” outputs, 
given inputs related to public spending. The efficiency is calculated by data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) allowing for variable returns to scale (Banker, Charnes and Cooper,1984). We considered only 
one input here, which is the total public spending per capita. Outputs were chosen to cover a range of 
economic and social indicators that fiscal policy in China is known to aim; the former consisted of 
GDP per capita, and disposable income per capita in both urban and rural areas, whereas the latter 
covered developments in education, health care and infrastructure, which are detailed in Table 1 (see 
Appendix-I). The efficiency of an individual decision-making unit (DMU) was evaluated by comparing 
the position of an overall output indicator for that unit, to the frontier formed by the same indicator for 
all units. The index is a number between zero and one3. 
Figure 3 plots the calculated efficiency. The East and the Middle were always more efficient. The 
former was led by the latter in the early 2000s, but it caught up finally; and the two regions converged 
after the crisis. The West was clearly less efficient, but its pattern mimicked that of the Middle. The 
country-level score varies between 0.6-0.7, showing public spending was, overall, reasonably 
efficient. 
 
Empirical Model 
In this section we set up the benchmark empirical model, allowing for control factors  commonly found  
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                                                                             Source: Authors’ Presentation using NBSC Data 
 
Figure 3. Efficiency of Public Spending Calculated by DEA 
 
to be significant as reviewed earlier, for H1 to be tested. Specifically, we modeled the relationship 
between the efficiency of public spending (Eff) and the ratio of public investment (PInv) in a panel 
Tobit model setting. The Tobit model features a “censored” dependent variable, whose value is set to 
the boundary value allowed by the theory when the actual observed value is beyond that theoretical 
boundary. Using the OLS method with censored data will cause the least squares estimates to be 
biased and inconsistent. Since the efficiency scores calculated by DEA are, by definition, “censored 
from above” (i.e., =Min ( ,1)), the OLS estimator was no longer appropriate. For this 
reason, a Tobit model was used instead. 
We define: 
 
   (1) 
 
where α is the constant, X={ ,..., } is a vector of control variables, ϕ is a K×1 vector of 
coefficients,  is the unit-specific effect,  is the time fixed effect, and ~N(0,σ ²) is the random 
error for each cross-sectional unit. When , (1) reduces to ; data from this 
observation will not be used for estimation. When , 
, data from this observation will be used  
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for estimation. By definition, Eff should never be below zero. Hence, estimation of equation (1), the 
Tobit model, is essentially an estimation combined with an observation selecting process confined by 
the measurement of the dependent variable. 
A key assumption regarding the specification of equation (1) is that, by allowing for a squared term 
(PInv²), it assumes there exists an “optimal” investment ratio which maximizes the efficiency, ceteris 
paribus. This makes sense in practice if one considers diminishing return; while rising investment may 
always imply rising output, its marginal impact is not likely. Numerically, this would imply γ<0, and that 
the marginal impact of PInv on Eff to depend on the actual ratio of public investment. Since, PInv ∈ 
[0,1], for  to be not always negative, it also requires β>0. 
The control variables were chosen to be human capital (HC), population density (Pop), openness 
(Open), growth rates of GDP per capita (GGDP), government size (GovSize) and fiscal revenue per 
capita (GRev). These are variables broadly found to be significant in explaining the efficiency in 
previous works (e.g., Chen and Zhang, 2008; Chen and Zhang, 2011; Tang and Wang, 2012). 
The model was estimated by using Stata 14, with annual data of 31 provinces between 2000 and 
2017. The measurement and descriptive statistics are detailed in Table 2. 
 
Variables Definition Mean S.D. Min Max 
PInv Ratio of pub. inv. to tot. pub. spd. 0.3343 0.0531 0.1897 0.5039 
HC Average years of education 7.9698 1.2845 3.0000 12.3700 
Pop Number of people per km2 0.4159 0.6066 0.0021 3.8381 
Open Ratio of import and export to GDP 0.3107 0.3833 0.0170 1.7222 
GGDP Per capita GDP growth rate 3.0569 2.4118 0.2759 12.8994 
GovSize Gov. consumption to GDP 0.1562 0.0607 0.0845 0.5226 
GRev Per capita general budget income 0.3329 0.3896 0.0209 2.7470 
             Source: Authors’ Computation using Stata 14 
                                            
 
Table 2. Measurement of Data and Descriptive Statistics 
 
RESULTS 
 
The Correlation Matrix 
We start by reporting the correlation matrix for all the variables as shown in Table 3. The first column 
shows the correlations between efficiency and the  other variables. The correlation coefficient  between  
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efficiency and public investment is -0.63 which is reasonably high. This supports the inclusion of the 
investment ratio in our benchmark regression4. The table also reports the correlation coefficients 
between the exogenous variables. Most values are reasonably low, though some correlations among 
the control values are higher. Nevertheless, since these correlations do not affect either the theoretical 
interpretation or the empirical estimate of the marginal impact of PInv on Eff (which is the focal point 
of this paper), they do not affect our study. The only correlation that might be a concern is the one 
between PInv and GovSize (0.80), which is relatively high. In order to check how this correlation might 
affect our finding, we conduct a robustness check by dropping GovSize for a new estimation. We 
report the finding in Table 6 (see Appendix-II). We found that the inclusion/removal of GovSize hardly 
affects the estimates of our models.  
 
 Eff PInv HC Pop Open GGDP GovSize GRev 
Eff 1.0000        
PInv -0.6339 1.0000       
HC 0.1647 -0.4230 1.0000      
Pop 0.0223 -0.2076 0.4840 1.0000     
Open -0.0290 -0.2188 0.4498 0.7087 1.0000    
GGDP 0.0224 -0.0259 0.7471 0.5288 0.4711 1.0000   
GovSize -0.6264 0.8050 -0.4153 -0.1984 -0.1148 -0.1357 1.0000  
GRev -0.1020 0.0238 0.7065 0.6465 0.5231 0.9297 -0.0310 1.0000 
                  Source: Authors’ Computation using Stata 14 
                                            
 
Table 3. The Correlation Matrix 
 
-Does Public Spending Structure Affect the Efficiency of Spending? 
Table 4 reports the Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates of the model. All the control variables, except 
HC and GovSize, are highly significant. Of these, Pop affects efficiency positively, while Open, GGDP 
and GRev affect efficiency negatively. The estimated coefficients of our most interested variables, PInv 
and PInv², are 0.82 and -1.77, respectively, with the expected signs. The estimates are significant not 
only individually but also jointly5. 
The above suggests the structure of public spending does affect the efficiency of spending. 
According to the estimation, a 1 percent rise  in the  investment ratio  would change the  efficiency  by 
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  =0.82+2×(-1.77)×PInv percent  –  hence, a positive marginal impact when PInv is below 23 
percent and a negative impact when it exceeds the threshold. Since  =2 γ<0, it also 
confirms our hypothesis (H1) of concavity of the efficiency function with respect to PInv. Hence, over-
investing can impair efficiency. 
 
PInv PInv2 HC Pop Open GGDP GovSize GRev 
0.8225* 
(0.4440) 
-1.7711** 
(0.6277) 
0.0056 
(0.0093) 
0.1750** 
(0.0242) 
-0.0956** 
(0.0217) 
-0.1882** 
(0.0617) 
-0.0918 
(0.0857) 
-0.1017** 
(0.0304) 
Joint significance of PInv & PInv2  (f-stat) 33.83 
Unit-specific effect Yes 
Time fixed effect Yes 
Number of Obs 527 
                  Source: Authors’ Computation using Stata 14  
                  Note: **, and * denote the level of significance at 1%, and 5%, respectively. 
                                            
 
Table 4. ML Estimates of the Benchmark Model 
 
-Have Local Governments Overinvested? 
Figures 4-6 (shown below) compare the timelines of public investment ratio of local governments in 
the East, the Middle, and the West, to the optimal investment ratio found in the previous section. It 
turns out that all provinces have over-invested by a substantial margin – about 50 percent - compared 
 
 
                                                              Source: Authors’ Presentation using NBSC Data 
 
Figure 4. Public Investment Ratio in East Provinces 
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                                                                        Source: Authors’ Presentation using NBSC Data 
 
Figure 5. Public Investment Ratio in Middle Provinces 
 
 
                                                                       Source: Authors’ Presentation using NBSC Data 
 
Figure 6. Public Investment Ratio in West Provinces 
 
to the optimal rate. The bias was about the same across the whole country, though it was more stable 
in the East and the West, while the middle provinces experienced increasing bias after the crisis. The 
most over-invested provinces in the East are Tianjin and Shanghai, whose average investment ratios 
both exceed 40 percent. The most over-invested middle provinces are Heilongjiang (35%), Henan 
(33%), Jilin (32%), and Anhui (32%). The most over-invested west provinces are Inner Mongolia, Tibet 
and Ningxia (all above 40% throughout), and  also Chongqing and  Qinghai (around 43%  since 2011).  
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Overall, we find that, apart from a couple of outliers (such as Guangdong in the East and Hebei in the 
Middle), local government budgets in China have suffered a severe efficiency problem due to over-
investments. 
 
-Accounting for Economic Growth? A Model Variant with Cross-term between GDP Growth and the 
Investment Ratio 
It may be argued that, although the benchmark model (1) has allowed for the role of GDP growth, the 
growth itself could have had an impact on how efficiency is affected by the other variables, especially 
the investment ratio which tends to reflect fiscal authorities’ responses to local economic 
development. For example, raising the investment ratio in a well-developed region may result in 
“excess capacity” — a widely concerned efficiency problem confronting Chinese officials in recent 
years. On the contrary, where the local economy is underdeveloped, a modest rise in public 
investment (such as investing in infrastructure) may turn out to be very efficient due to fiscal 
multipliers. 
In this section, we tested second hypothesis (H2) by adding to the benchmark model a cross-term 
between GDP growth and the investment ratio: 
 
                                                                     
                                                                                                                                (2) 
where θ  measures the impact of GDP growth on the marginal impact of the investment ratio on 
efficiency. The estimated model is reported in Table 5. 
 
PInv PInv2 GGDP×PInv HC Pop Open GGDP GovSize GRev 
0.1142 
(0.4627) 
-1.3267* 
(0.6230) 
3.1229** 
(0.6942) 
0.0052 
(0.0091) 
0.1800** 
(0.0237) 
-0.1123** 
(0.0217) 
-1.2073** 
(0.2345) 
-0.0720 
(0.0842) 
-0.1257** 
(0.0303) 
Joint significance of PInv, PInv2 & GGDP×PInv  (f-stat) 55.16 
Unit-specific effect Yes 
Time fixed effect Yes 
Number of Obs. 527 
        Source: Authors’ Computation using Stata 14  
        Note: **, and * denote the level of significance at 1%, and 5%, respectively. 
                                            
 
Table 5. ML Estimates of the Model Allowing for GGDP × PInv 
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It turns out that the cross-term is highly significant. Value of θ  is positive (3.12), suggesting higher 
growth implies higher marginal efficiency of investing. This is broadly in line with the perception that 
faster growth generally happens in less developed areas with a higher marginal return. Now that  
=β +2 γ⋅PInvit +θ ⋅GGDPit, the optimal investment ratio becomes a function of growth. Using the 
sample mean of the growth rates, we found the “long-run’” optimal ratio reduced to 19 percent at the 
country level, and 18 percent, 19 percent, and 21 percent if we further narrow down the scope for the 
East, the Middle, and the West, respectively. Thus, a slightly lower optimal ratio compared to the 
implication of the benchmark model. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper studied how the structure of public spending affects the efficiency of spending in China. It 
focuses on the investment ratio, which is exceptionally high compared to the general practice in the 
rest of the world. By estimating a Tobit model allowing for a number of control variables, we find that 
the efficiency of public spending is an increasing function of the investment ratio up to an optimal rate. 
The estimated optimal rate is 23 percent (or 19% if GDP growth is assumed to affect the marginal 
impact of the investment ratio). According to this standard, most local governments have failed to 
allocate their sources efficiently; public spending has leaned far too much on investment, which is 
inefficient, as policy target is multifaceted covering not only economic indicators but also social 
indicators.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
The above findings provide valuable implications both for the theory and for policies. For the former, it 
testifies to the hypotheses that the structure of public spending itself matters for the efficiency of the 
spending and that, an optimal spending structure exists. For the latter, it implies that, given the 
financial stress confronting local budgets as reforms in China deepen, an “efficient” allocation of fiscal 
revenue would require policymakers to concentrate much more on non-productive projects, such as 
spending on social benefits, education, and healthcare –  hence, the provision of public goods and 
services. Local governments have been clearly over-investing, which needs to be reduced for the 
overall budget efficiency to be improved. Future investment projects should be evaluated, monitored, 
and reviewed more carefully to avoid unnecessary and repeated investments.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
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The main limitation of this study lies in that, as a complete set of city-level data is not available, we 
could only construct our panel model at the provincial level. This may not fully reflect how “local” 
budgets are managed in practice, as most public spending issues in China happen at the city level. 
While our study –  using data at a “higher” level –  remains a good reflection of the reality, a fruitful 
direction for future research would be to carry out a robustness check with city-level data. Another 
interesting extension would be to shift the focus to “public consumption”. In this paper we did not 
probe into the constituents of it. Nevertheless, within this broad category there are spending of quite 
different natures, which is worth investigating in the future. Both these extensions are on our research 
agenda. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1The Reform, took place in 1994, was aimed at improving the financial position of the Central government, by largely increasing 
its sharing of total tax revenue relative to that of the local governments. 
 
2The ratios for US and EA over the same period were, respectively, about 11% and 6%. 
 
3The most efficient units have output indicators lying on the frontier and are scored 1; a completely inefficient unit produces no 
output and is scored 0. 
 
4Since our benchmark model assumes a non-linear relationship between Eff and PInv, the sign of this correlation coefficient is 
not quite relevant here. 
 
5To validate this benchmark finding, we considered four alternative specifications, one with the social factors (HC and Pop) 
excluded, one with the macroeconomic factors (Open and GGDP) excluded, one with the fiscal factors (GovSzie and GRev) 
excluded, and one with all the control factors excluded. The likelihood ratio test suggests that all these model variants are 
significantly “less likely” compared to Model (1). Hence, there is good evidence that this benchmark specification is favored by 
the data. A similar exercise is conducted for Model (2) which we consider below. We found similar result. The likelihood ratio 
tests for these alternative specifications are reported in Table 7 in Appendix-Ill. 
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Appendix-I 
 
Inputs Outputs 
Total public 
spending per 
capita 
GDP per capita 
Disposable income per capita in urban areas 
Disposable income per capita in rural areas 
Ratio of faculty and staff in higher education institutions to total regional population 
Ratio of faculty and staff in secondary vocational schools to total regional 
population 
Ratio of faculty and staff in general secondary schools to total regional population 
Ratio of faculty and staff in primary schools to total regional population 
Medical beds per capital 
Doctors per capital 
Ratio of Effective irrigated acreage to total crop acreage 
Railway mileage per capita 
Electricity consumption per capita in rural areas 
                               Source: Authors’ Presentation 
 
 
Table 1. Factors Chosen to Calculate DEA Efficiency 
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Appendix-II 
 
 With GovSize Without GovSize 
   
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (1) Model (2) 
PInv 0.8225* 0.1142 0.8004* 0.0903 
 (0.4440) (0.4627) (0.4436) (0.4619) 
PInv2 -1.7711*** -1.3267** -1.7222*** -1.2844** 
 (0.6277) (0.6230) (0.6262) (0.6210) 
GGDPPInv  3.1229***  3.1518*** 
  (0.6942)  (0.6934) 
HC 0.0056 0.0052 0.0062 0.0057 
 (0.0093) (0.0091) (0.0093) (0.0091) 
Pop 0.1750*** 0.1800*** 0.1731*** 0.1785*** 
 (0.0242) (0.0237) (0.0241) (0.0236) 
Open -0.0956*** -0.1123*** -0.0962*** -0.1129*** 
 (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0217) (0.0216) 
GGDP -0.1882*** -1.2073*** -0.1832*** -1.2128*** 
 (0.0617) (0.2345) (0.0616) (0.2344) 
GRev -0.1017*** -0.1257*** -0.1047*** -0.1283*** 
 (0.0304) (0.0303) (0.0303) (0.0301) 
GovSize -0.0918 -0.0720   
 (0.0857) (0.0842)   
Obs. 527 527 527 527 
                              Source: Authors’ Computation 
                              Note: ***, **, and * denote the level of significance at .1%, 1%, and 5%, respectively. 
 
 
Table 6. Model Estimates with/without GovSize 
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Appendix-III 
 
Alternative model variants to Model (1) 
 
Excl. social factors 
(HC, Pop) 
Excl. macro-econ factors 
(Open, GGDP) 
Excl. fiscal factors 
(GovSize, GRev) 
All controls 
excluded 
LR test stat 56.0 25.8 13.0 106.3 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 
Alternative model variants to Model (2) 
 
Excl. social factors 
(HC, Pop) 
Excl. macro-econ factors 
(Open, GGDP) 
Excl. fiscal factors 
(GovSize, GRev) 
All controls 
excluded 
LR test stat 60.8 43.0 18.6 117.4 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
           Source: Authors’ Computation   
           Note: H0: the alternative model is nested in the benchmark model. 
 
 
Table 7. Likelihood Ratio Tests for Alternative Model Variants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
